

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. SGAA- 2501
KAPOK #2400

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SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FEB 18 1954

TO : Chief, SE
FROM : C Attn: C

DATE: _____

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OBOPUS/PARAM

SPECIFIC— Recapitulation of OBOPUS Operations, 1 January to 31 December 1953

A. Agent Operations

1. Infiltrates

a. Overland

Willow - 5 men
Throttler - 2 men
Fig - 5 men

b. Air drops

Apple - 4 men
Orange - 3 men
Plum - 1 man

c. Total agents infiltrated: 20

(Agents operating since 1952: Apple - 3 men).

d. Total agents operative: 23

2. Infiltrations:

Willow - first trip - 5 men
Throttler - first trip - 2 men
Fig - first trip - 5 men
Fig - second trip - 5 men
Apple - first trip - 4 men (1 in January, 3 in May)
Orange - first trip - 3 men
Plum - first trip - 1 man.

TOTAL INFILTRATIONS - 25 men

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

3. Casualties (based on

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3. Casualties (based on Radio Tirana reports)

- a. Killed - 3 men
- b. Captured - 6 men
- c. Missing - 2 men

TOTAL CASUALTIES - 11 men

4. Exfiltrees

Willow - 5 men
Throttler - 2 men
Fig - 5 men

TOTAL EXFILTREES - 12 men

5. Aborted operations: 1 (partial)

6. Agents presently operative: 0

7. Agents on hand for 1954 operations (as of this date): 15

P/M agents:

- * GASH
- AIRWISE
- * AIRERED
- AIRBORNE
- * RNORDAIN
- AIRWORTHY
- RNDEPLOY
- AIRSLACK
- * GADUD
- GADUFFER
- TOTAL - 10

W/T agents:

AIRLOCK
AIPUMP
AIRWAY
AIRBLOWN
RNDOLLAR
TOTAL - 5

TOTAL AGENTS - 15

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* Probable disposals.

8. Disposals

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8. Disposals

RNDESIGN
AIBASH
AIRBRAKE
AIRSHIP

B. Air Operations

1. Resupply drops

Apple - * 30 January, 4 bundles dropped, 4 received
* 1 May, 4 bundles dropped, 4 received
* 4 June, 2 bundles dropped, 0 received
22 July, 5 bundles dropped, 3 received
19 September, 2 bundles dropped, 2 received

TOTALS ** 17 bundles dropped, 13 received

* Drops accompanying agents

** These figures can not be evaluated until the question of Apple's control is solved.

2. Leaflet drops

* 28 January - 125,000 leaflets
** 1 May - 160,000 leaflets
15 July - 500,000 leaflets
22 August - 300,000 OBEEKS
25 August - 150,000 leaflets
9 September - 725,000 leaflets and OBEEKS
** 19 September - 520,000 leaflets and OBEEKS
** 23 October - 220,000 leaflets
22 November - 750,000 leaflets, OBEEKS, and food parcels

3. Propaganda supply drops - one

4. Dummy drops

20 February
4 June

* Aborted personnel drop

** Cover for resupply missions.

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C. Communications

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C. Communications

1. Apple/2 - 126 contacts
2. Apple/3 - 16 contacts
3. Fig - 9 contacts

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Total number of word groups exchanged: 11,581.

D. VALUABLE Operations

1. Agent operations

LUCID Team - 5 men

This team was staged and infiltrated once and was almost immediately forced out. The complement of the team was amended and it went in again. It is believed to have been forced into Yugoslavia. The team leader is Shaban Prenthi.

2. Leaflet missions

10-12 March - 500,000 leaflets
3 October - 435,000 leaflets
26 November - 1,000,000 leaflets

E. Comment

1. 1953 operations were dominated by the loss of Apple Team. The importance of this loss and the capture of six members of the team can not be minimized. Apple was comprised of the highest calibre agents ever mounted by OBOPUS. RNPOTLOG was probably our best agent because of his fame, experience and influence. AIRTIGHT, also, was an unusually intelligent and experienced leader. The agents involved represented our only assets for the Mati-Mirdite area; two of them were W/T operators. We have lost control over the 200 man force Apple could allegedly muster as well. It was also through Apple Team that we planned to develop operations into the Tirane area.

2. Fig and Willow Teams completed a mission apiece. They both succeeded in maintaining contacts established in 1952 and, in the case of Willow, established some new contacts. Fig was betrayed by a contact and forced to fight through two ambushes killing an unknown number of Communist pursuers in the process. Both teams collected a certain amount of P/W intelligence as well as positive information. The results produced by these two well seasoned teams represent our best efforts for 1953.

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3. Throttler was given

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3. Throttler was given one last chance to produce. It is the feeling of this office that the returns of their mission did not justify the cost and effort expended in mounting the team.

4. The Plum leader and Orange team were a total loss to us. It is perhaps noteworthy that AICHIP, the Plum leader, was not mentioned in the communiques from Tirane regarding agents captured or killed. The same is true of RNDOMINO, the original Apple W/T operator.

5. Of the five teams operating during the 1953 season, three returned safely to Greece. Of these, two were successful (Willow and Fig) and one unimpressive (Throttler). The other two teams (Apple and Orange) and the leader of Plum, who jumped without his men, were captured or annihilated by the opposition. We suffered almost 50% casualties including killed, captured and missing.

6. We are of the opinion that it is still impossible to establish the time that the control of Apple Team was effected. When sufficient information is in to accurately reconstruct the history of this operation, further analysis should be helpful to us in learning the opposition's technique.

7. Apart from the teams mounted by OBOPUS, certain developments of operational interest occurred during 1953 that should be mentioned here.

a. The story we received from AIQUAD and AILAKE regarding AILION has been carefully checked for veracity and we have been unable to find any evidence of falsehood. Beyond revealing AILION's desire to defect and outlining the elaborate plan evolved to remove him to the west, AIQUAD and AILAKE were of little operational value. They could propose no practical alternative plan for contacting AILION once the helicopter idea was rejected, and flatly refused to take any active role in bringing their proposed coup to a successful conclusion. We have dropped token containers to AILION on two occasions with assurances that his plight was known and included similar messages to him in HTGRUBBY broadcasts which we intend to continue from time to time. We can do nothing further on this matter until some more concrete information on AILION's whereabouts and avenues of contact can be developed. We regard this affair as a favorable development even if we have seen the end of it, as AILION has probably deprived the Yugoslavs of his net. It is true that we know of no reason prohibiting AILION from returning to Yugoslavia and acting as if nothing had happened other than the possibility of compromise by one of his confidants. On the other hand, if he is serious in his conviction concerning the evil of Yugoslav intentions toward his country, it is likely that he will remain in Albania. He seems to have the capability to survive in his country indefinitely. We will not abandon our interest in this matter.

b. The development of information provided by Hito on Albanian Army wireless procedure has been exploited on a limited scale and expansion of this operation is under consideration.

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c. The arrival of

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c. The arrival of Mehmet Kuci, the self confessed Albanian IS agent, suggests a CE operation in Italy, if his story can be confirmed.

d. Interrogation of Thanasi Nikola has yielded a wealth of information on coastal defenses south of Vlone. His intimate knowledge of this coast leads us to have more confidence than usual in the accuracy of his statements. This operational data will be most useful in the planning of sea infiltrations.

e. We were disappointed that the RNCASTING Vlone team did not materialize during the 1953 season.

f. The construction of OBATLANTIS is a noteworthy development from an operational standpoint. We believe this site will quickly pay for itself in terms of thorough and secure training. The service and infiltration vessel has contributed a great deal to the value of the island insofar as accessibility and support are concerned. We have not discounted the possibility of using it for infiltrations.

8. Although the casualties and disappointments of this operational season have been considerable, they are not out of line with the overall statistics of past OBOPUS operations. We have attempted to counter the increasing effectiveness of Albanian security forces with the infiltration of higher calibre and more thoroughly trained agents. Although we will continue the attempts to improve our assets we must accept the fact that the price of a so-called simmering pot in Albania is high.

16 February 1954

Rmw ~~W~~
RMW/WFH/lgk

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